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Abstract: This paper considers a resilient state estimation framework for unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs) that integrates a Kalman filter-like state estimator and an attack detector.
When an attack is detected, the state estimator uses only IMU signals as the GPS signals do
not contain legitimate information. This limited sensor availability induces a sensor drift
problem questioning the reliability of the sensor estimates. We propose a new resilience
measure, escape time, as the safe time within which the estimation errors remain in a
tolerable region with high probability. This paper analyzes the stability of the proposed
resilient estimation framework and quantifies a lower bound for the escape time. Moreover,
simulations of the UAV model demonstrate the performance of the proposed framework and
provide analytical results.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have become popular
as commercial, industrial and educational platforms. The
mechanical simplicity and agile maneuverability appeal
to many applications, such as media production, in-
spection, and precision agriculture. In all these applica-
tions, UAVs need reliable state estimation (e.g. position,
velocity) to perform various tasks. Most state estima-
tion techniques for UAVs use an inertial measurement
unit (IMU) and a global positioning system (GPS) re-
ceiver. However, GPS is vulnerable to spoofing attacks as
demonstrated in Warner and Johnston (2003). In Warner
and Johnston (2003), the Vulnerability Assessment Team
at Los Alamos National Laboratory demonstrated that
GPS spoofing attacks can be easily implemented by civil-
ians using GPS satellite simulator. Furthermore, increas-
ing applications of UAVs extend the area of operation to
the urban areas, where GPS signals are weak or denied
due to other structures such as skyscrapers, elevated
highways, and bridges.
Resilient UAV navigation requires timely attack detec-
tion and mitigation. From controls perspective, tradi-
tionally the GPS spoofing attack has been modeled as
a malicious signal injection. Attack detection research
against malicious signal injection has been studied ex-
tensively for the last several years. The attack detection
problem was formulated as an `0/`∞ optimization prob-
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lem in Fawzi et al. (2014); Pajic et al. (2014). In Mo
et al. (2014), an active detection scheme, by adding
random disturbance signal to the optimal control input,
was proposed to increase the detection rate trading off
for optimality. In Mo et al. (2010), the authors identify
maximum deviations of the state due to the sensor at-
tacks, while remaining stealthy due to the detection.
On the other hand, since the GPS signal injected by
the attacker would cause a discrepancy in the raw
antenna signal, the GPS spoofing attack can be detected
by examining the raw signal received by the antenna.
For example, the shape of the GPS signal strength in
polar coordinates was used to detect the GPS attack
in McMilin et al. (2014). In Chen et al. (2013), an array
of GPS antenna was used to detect the discrepancy
compared to the normal situations. The methods using
the raw GPS signals in McMilin et al. (2014); Chen et al.
(2013) have the potential to detect the stealthy attacks
defined in Mo et al. (2010). However, the methods using
the raw antenna signals usually require modifications of
the hardware or the low-level computing modules.
Unbiased state estimation in adversarial environments
can be challenging, because the estimator accumulates
errors due to attacks. In such cases, simple state detec-
tion can be a preferred method. Incomplete list of the
related results includes Mo et al. (2010); Pajic et al.
(2014); Yong et al. (2015); Kim et al. (2017). In these
efforts, the difference between the measured output and
the predicted output has been used to detect attacks
ar
X
iv
:1
90
6.
05
34
8v
1 
 [c
s.S
Y]
  1
1 J
un
 20
19
and exclude corrupted sensor measurements. The rest of
the uncompromised redundant sensors are subsequently
used for estimation. We depart from this approach and
consider limited sensor redundancy. In particular, the
UAV model becomes undetectable in GPS-denied envi-
ronments. GPS denied state estimation has been studied
in Fuke and Krotkov (1996); Chung et al. (2001); Bevly
and Parkinson (2007), wherein the focus is on estab-
lishing the system output matrices that can be used for
standard (error state) Kalman filter for dead reckoning.
Contribution. This paper proposes a resilient estima-
tion framework for UAVs. The framework consists of
an attack detection module and a state estimator that
operates in two modes: (1) normal and (2) emergency.
In the normal mode, all available sensor signals are used
to estimate the state. In the emergency mode, only IMU
signals are fed to the state estimator. The limited sensor
availability leads to the sensor drift problem, and the
estimates become gradually unreliable. We quantify a
new resilience measure, the escape time, which is defined
by the safe time within which the estimation errors
remain within a tolerable region with a high probabil-
ity. We analyze the stability of the proposed estimator
and find a lower bound of the escape time. Simulations
are conducted to show the effectiveness of the proposed
framework.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
In Section 2, we introduce the notation convention in
our paper and the dynamic system model. In the same
section, we formulate the problem. In Section 3, we
propose a resilient state estimation and detection method
for GPS attack detection. Section 4 presents the stability
analysis of the proposed estimator, and studies escape
time to avoid instability. The significance of the escape
time and the potential impact of it are described in
Section 5. In Section 6, a numerical simulation of a UAV
under GPS spoofing attack is presented.
2. PRELIMINARIES
This section discusses some preliminary notations/no-
tions, system models, problem formulation, and χ2 at-
tack detector.
2.1 Notations
We use the subscript k of xk to denote the time index;
Rn denotes the n-dimensional Euclidean space; Rn×m
denotes the set of all n ×m real matrices; A> denotes
the transpose of matrix A; I denotes the identity matrix
with an appropriate dimension; ‖·‖ denotes the standard
Euclidean norm for vector or an induced matrix norm;
E[ · ] denotes the expectation operator; × is used to
denote matrix multiplication when the multiplied terms
are in different lines.
2.2 System model
We use the following linear model to consider the flight
system dynamics and the attacker model:
xk = Axk−1 + Buk−1 + wk−1
yGk = C
Gxk + dk + v
G
k
yIk = C
I(xk − xk−1) + vIk,
(1)
where xk ∈ Rn, yGk ∈ RmG , yIk ∈ RmI are the state,
the GPS measurement, and the IMU measurement, re-
spectively. IMU returns a noisy measurement of the state
difference. The noise signals wk, v
G
k , v
I
k are assumed to
be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaus-
sian random variables with zero means and covariances
E[wkw>k ] = Σw, E[vGk (vGk )>] = ΣG, E[vIk(vIk)>] = ΣI ,
respectively. The vector dk ∈ RmG is the GPS spoofing
attack, which is unknown to the defender. We assume
that the attacker can inject any signal dk into y
G
k .
2.3 Problem formulation
Given the system (1) with two sensors GPS and IMU,
the defender aims to detect the GPS spoofing attack and
resiliently estimate the state. Furthermore, the defender
needs to analyze the reliability of the state estimates in
the adversarial situation.
2.4 χ2 attack detector
For linear systems in (1) with Gaussian additive noises
wk, v
G
k , and v
I
k, state estimations of the standard
Kalman filter (KF) are Gaussian as well. Through this
observation, the χ2 statistical test is widely used in
attack detection, Teixeira et al. (2010); Mo et al. (2014);
Guo et al. (2018), to distinguish whether the error is
induced by statistical noises or attacks. In particular,
the χ2 test has two hypothesis:
H0 : dk = 0, H1 : dk 6= 0. (2)
By testing (2), we interpret the result as the following:
(1) Rejecting H0 (accepting H1): there is significant
evidence that the error is not zero and the error
can be due to the attack.
(2) Keeping H0: we do not have enough evidence to
believe that there is an attack.
3. RESILIENT STATE ESTIMATION DESIGN
The proposed estimation and detection system consists
of the attack detector and the state estimator. The attack
detector performs a statistical hypothesis test to decide
whether the GPS signal is being attacked, based on
output prediction error and error-covariance estimated
by the state estimator. Depending on the result of
the hypothesis testing, the state estimation switches
its mode between the normal mode and the emergency
mode. In the normal mode, the state estimator uses
both GPS and IMU to estimate the state and detect an
attack. If an attack is detected, the estimator switches
to emergency mode, where IMU is used to estimate the
state. If the attack detector determines that the GPS
signals are clean, the state estimation can return to the
normal mode.
3.1 Normal mode
State estimation. The defender implements an esti-
mator and χ2 detector to estimate the state and detect
Fig. 1. A resilient state estimation framework consisting
of GPS attack detection and two modes (normal and
emergency) state estimation.
the GPS spoofing attack. The following KF-like state
estimator is used to estimate the current state:
xˆk = Axˆk−1 + Buk−1 + KGk (y
G
k −CG(Axˆk−1+Buk−1))
+ KIk(y
I
k −CI(Axˆk−1 + Buk−1 − xˆk−1))
Pk = (A−KkCA + KkDC)Pk−1(A−KkCA+KkDC)
+ (I−KkC)Σw(I−KkC)> + KkΣyK>k
, f(Pk−1,Kk), (3)
where Kk = [K
G
k , K
I
k],
C =
[
CG
CI
]
, Σy =
[
ΣG 0
0 ΣI
]
, D =
[
0 0
0 I
]
.
The optimal gain Kk can be obtained by solving the
following problem: minKk tr (Pk), which is an uncon-
strained convex optimization problem. By taking its
derivative with respect to decision variable Kk and set-
ting it equal to zero, we have
(A−KkCA + KkDC)Pk−1(−CA + DC)>
− (I−KkC)ΣwC> + KkΣy = 0,
and the solution is
Kk = (APk−1(CA−DC)> + ΣwC>)
× ((CA−DC)Pk−1(CA−DC)> + CΣwC> + Σy)−1
, g(Pk−1). (4)
Attack detection. We implement χ2 statistic test in (2)
using CUSUM (CUmulative SUM) algorithm, which is
widely used in change detection research Page (1954);
Barnard (1959); Lai (1995).
Before proposing a detection algorithm, we consider
some properties of attack vector estimates. Since dk =
yGk −CGxk−vGk , given the previous state estimate xˆk−1
by the state estimator, we estimate the attack vector by
comparing the sensor output and the output prediction:
dˆk = y
G
k −CG(Axˆk−1 + Buk−1).
The current estimate xˆk should not be used, because it
is correlated with the current output; i.e., E[xˆkyGk ] 6= 0.
Due to the Gaussian noises wk and vk injected to
the linear system in (1), the state estimates follow
Gaussian distribution, since any finite linear combination
of Gaussian distributions is also Gaussian. Similarly, dˆk
is Gaussian as well, and thus the use of χ2 test (2) is
justified. The χ2 test compares the normalized attack
vector estimate dˆ>k (P
d
k)
−1dˆk with χ2df (α):
Accept H0 if dˆ
>
k (P
d
k)
−1dˆk ≤ χ2df (α)
Accept H1 if dˆ
>
k (P
d
k)
−1dˆk > χ2df (α),
(5)
where Pdk , E[d˜kd˜>k ] = CG(APk−1A> + Σw)(CG)> +
ΣG, and χ
2
df (α) is the threshold found in the Chi-square
table. In χ2df (α), df denotes the degree of freedom, and
α denotes the statistical significance level.
The proposed χ2 CUSUM detector is characterized by
the detector state Sk ∈ R:
Sk = δSk−1 + (dˆk)>(Pdk)
−1dˆk, S0 = 0, (6)
where 0 < δ < 1 is the pre-determined forgetting factor.
The attack detector will raise an alarm
if Sk >
∞∑
i=0
δiχ2df (α) =
χ2df (α)
1− δ .
Remark 3.1. Comparing to standard CUSUM algo-
rithm in Page (1954), the proposed CUSUM detector has
asymptotic behavior, where the impact of the attacks on
the detector state Sk decays asymptotically.
3.2 Emergency mode
When an attack is detected, the defender switches emer-
gency mode on. Let us denote ka the time when the
attack is detected, which satisfies Ska >
χ2df (α)
1−δ . As
well as normal mode, the state estimation and attack
detection continue in normal mode. However, the state
estimation can only use the output measured by IMU
in emergency mode. Without GPS output, IMU based
estimation accumulates error and eventually diverges as
we analyze in the following section.
State estimation. The state estimation algorithm (3)
with KGk = 0 is used to recursively estimate the state xˆk
and the error covariance Pk.
Attack detection. At each time k, the CUSUM detec-
tor (6) is used to update the detector state Sk and detect
the attack. The corresponding covariance can be found
by Pdk , E[dˆkdˆ>k ] = CG(APk−1A>+ Σw)(CG)>+ ΣG.
If Sk <
χ2df (α)
1−δ , then it returns to the normal mode.
4. STABILITY AND ESCAPE TIME
This section presents analysis on stability of the state
estimation and estimation error escape time.
4.1 Stability analysis of state estimation
In this section, we would like to discuss stability and
instability conditions of the proposed estimator. Toward
this end, we show that the estimator is stable in the
normal mode, and unstable in the emergency mode.
In particular, the state estimate xˆk obtained through
observer (3) is unbiased. Moreover, its covariance is
bounded, if (CG,A) is detectable, as shown in the
following theorem.
Theorem 4.1. Given E[xˆ0] = x0, we have E[xˆk] = xk
for all k ≥ 0. If (CG,A) is detectable, then Pk is
bounded.
Proof. State estimation error x˜k = xk − xˆk can be
described by
x˜k = Ax˜k−1 + KGk (Ax˜k−1 + wk−1 + v
G
k )
+ KIk(C
I(Ax˜k−1 − x˜k−1 + wk−1) + vIk).
Notice that E[wk] = 0, E[vGk ] = 0, and E[vIk] = 0.
Given E[xˆ0] = x0, we have E[xˆ1] = x1 by (7). Assume
E[xˆk−1] = xk−1, then E[xˆk] = xk by (7). By induction,
we conclude that E[xˆk] = xk for ∀k. Therefore, E[xˆk] =
xk.
Consider Pk(K
G
k ,K
I
k), where we emphasize the depen-
dency of Pk on K
G
k , K
I
k. With K
I
k = 0, Pk(K
G
k , 0) is
bounded by Corollary 5.2 in Anderson and Moore (1981),
because (CG,A) is detectable. Since Kk is chosen opti-
mal, we have Pk(K
G
k ,K
I
k) ≤ Pk(KGk , 0). This completes
the proof. 
If the GPS signals are not available for state estimation,
the covariance of the state estimation is expected to
be unstable over time under Assumption 4.1. Let us
first define necessary notations: C¯I , CI(I − A−1),
A¯ , (I − LC¯I)A and L , Σw(CIA−1)>((C¯I +
C¯IA−1)Σw(CIA−1)> + ΣI)−1.
Assumption 4.1. Matrix A is invertible, and the pair
(C¯I , A¯) is not detectable.
Remark 4.1. Assumption 4.1 is satisfied with the dou-
ble integrator model with IMU, which is widely used to
design navigation controller for UAVs as in Kerns et al.
(2014). In this case, C¯I = CI(I−A−1) = 0, and A¯ = A,
where A is not asymptotically stable. Then, the pair
(C¯I ,A) is not detectable and it fulfills Assumption 4.1.
Theorem 4.2. Assume KGk = 0. Then, under Assump-
tion 4.1, Pk is increasing unboundedly.
Proof. We prove the statement by finding an equivalent
Kalman filtering problem, and then use the existing
stability result for the KF in Anderson and Moore
(1981).
Given KGk = 0, the state estimation error update law
can be obtained from (3):
x˜k = Ax˜k−1 −KIk(CI(I−A−1)Ax˜k−1 + CIwk−1 + vIk)
= Ax˜k−1 −KIk(CI(I−A−1)Ax˜k−1
+ CI(I−A−1)wk−1 + CIA−1wk−1 + vIk).
The above state estimation error update is the Kalman
filter solution of
xk = Axk−1 + wk−1
yk = C¯
Ixk + v¯
I
k,
where v¯Ik , CIA−1wk−1 + vIk. However, the pro-
cess noise and the measurement noise are coupled; i.e.,
E[wk−1v¯>k ] = Σw(A−1)>(CI)> 6= 0. Then, the optimal
gain is different from the Kalman gain used in the stan-
dard KF. To decouple the noises, it is a common practice
to add zero term L(yk−C¯Ixk−v¯Ik) to the state equation
above:
xk = Axk−1 + wk−1
+ L(yk − C¯I(Axk−1 + wk−1)− v¯Ik)
= (I− LC¯I)Axk−1 + Lyk + (I− LC¯I)wk−1 − Lv¯Ik
= A¯xk + u¯k + w¯k,
where u¯k = Lyk, and w¯k−1 = (I − LC¯I)wk−1 − Lv¯Ik.
The gain L is chosen such that the process noise and
measurement noise are decoupled:
E[w¯kv¯>k ] = (I− LC¯I − LC¯IA−1)Σw(CIA−1)> − LΣI
= 0,
where the solution is
L = Σw(C
IA−1)>((C¯I + C¯IA−1)Σw(CIA−1)> + ΣI)−1.
Now, the state estimation error update law (3) and its
covariance update law (3) with KGk = 0 are the Kalman
filtering solution of
xk+1 = A¯xk + u¯k + w¯k
yk = C¯
Ixk + v¯
I
k,
where the process noise and the measurement noise are
decoupled from each other. Under Assumption 4.1, Pk is
unstable by Corollary 5.2 in Anderson and Moore (1981).
This completes the proof. 
Remark 4.2. Stability with GPS (Theorem 4.1) and
instability without GPS (Theorems 4.2) are generalized
into a system with any relative sensors. This is be-
cause output model yIk in (1) can represent any relative
measurement sensor model regardless of their internal
error state dynamic. This is a sharp contrast to existing
analytical result. For example, it is a common practice to
introduce error state variables for IMU as in Bevly and
Parkinson (2007). Using their specific system and output
model, one can check detectability of the augmented
system to guarantee stability/instability. However, it is
not generalized because each system has different sys-
tem/output(sensor) matrices. 
4.2 Escape time of the state estimation error
This section proposes a new resilience measure, the es-
cape time, and analyzes the escape time in the emergency
mode.
It has been revealed in Theorem 4.2 that the state
estimation becomes less trustful, if GPS signals are
compromised for a long time. Therefore, the UAV should
escape from the GPS spoofer at a certain time before the
estimation becomes unreliable. Formally, we define the
escape time as follows.
Definition 4.1. The escape time kesc ≥ 0 is the time
difference between the attack time ka and the first time
instance when the estimation error xk − xˆk may not be
in tolerable error distance ζ ∈ Rn with the significance
α, i.e.
kesc = arg mink≥ka k − ka
s.t. ζ>P−1k ζ < χ
2
df (α).
Given the desired confidence level α, the degree of
freedom df , we have χ2df (α). Since the optimal gains
Kka , Kka+1, · · · can be found in advance at k = ka,
the corresponding covariance matrices Pka ,Pka+1, · · ·
can also be found by the covariance update law in (3).
Algorithm 1 presents escape time calculation. Given
ka, the state estimation errors may not remain in the
tolerable region with the predetermined confidence α
after kesc.
Algorithm 1 Escape time calculation
Input: ka, α, df , ζ;
Return: kesc;
1: k = ka;
2: while ζTP−1k ζ > χ
2
df (α) do
3: k = k + 1;
4: end while
5: kesc = k − ka.
If C¯I = 0 as in Remark 4.1, then a lower bound of the
escape time can also be found before actually operating
the UAV as shown in Theorem 4.3. Let P denote the
stationary point of the covariance update (3), i.e.
P = f (P, g(P)) ,
where f(·) and g(·) were defined in (3) and (4) respec-
tively. Matrices used in the theorem are defined by
Σ¯ , (I−KIkCI)Σw(I−KIkCI)> + KIkΣI(KIk)>.
Theorem 4.3. Assume C¯I = 0 and GPS spoofing
attacks start after Pk converges to P. Then, a lower
bound of the escape time can be found by
• For ‖A‖ 6= 1,
kesc ≥
(
1
log ‖A‖2
)
log
 ‖ζ‖2χ2df (α) + ‖Σ¯‖‖A‖2−1
‖P‖+ ‖Σ¯‖‖A‖2−1

• For ‖A‖ = 1,
kesc ≥ (‖ζ‖2/χ2df (α)− ‖P‖)/‖Σ¯‖.
Proof. First, we derive an upper bound on ‖Pk‖. As-
sume ka = 0 and P0 = P without loss of generality.
Given KGk = 0, the covariance update law can be ob-
tained from (3):
Pk = APk−1A> + Σ¯, P0 = P, (7)
where Σ¯ is time-invariant because the optimal KIk is
time-invariant:
KIk = Σw(C
I)>(CIΣw(CI)> + ΣI)−1.
Applying basic matrix norm property to (7), we have
‖Pk‖ ≤ ‖A‖2‖Pk−1‖+ ‖Σ¯‖, ‖P0‖ = ‖P‖.
By recursively applying the bound above, we have
‖Pk‖ ≤ ‖A‖2k‖P0‖+ ‖Σ¯‖
k−1∑
i=0
‖A‖2i (8)
Now, we will apply the bound (8) to the χ2 test equation.
For the positive definite matrices Pk, we have
‖Pk‖−1‖ζ‖2 = λmin(P−1k )‖ζ‖2 ≤ ζ>P−1k ζ,
and thus the time k∆ that verifies
(‖A‖2k∆‖P0‖+ ‖Σ¯‖
k∆−1∑
i=0
‖A‖2i)−1‖ζ‖2 = χ2df (α) (9)
is a lower bound of the escape time k∆ ≤ kesc. If
‖A‖ = 1, then
‖ζ‖2/χ2df (α) = ‖P0‖+ k∆‖Σ¯‖,
which proves the theorem. If ‖A‖ 6= 1, by the sum of
geometric series, equation (9) becomes
‖ζ‖2/χ2df (α) = ‖A‖2k∆‖P0‖+ ‖Σ¯‖
‖A‖2k∆ − 1
‖A‖2 − 1 . (10)
By taking log on both sides, we have the desired result.

5. DISCUSSION
As a new resilience measure, the escape time provides a
new criterion for optimal path planning with increasing
uncertainties. In this section, we discuss relevant prob-
lems.
Landing
position
+
+
+
k=0
k=2
k=1
k ≤kesc
Uncertainty
Tolerance
Position est.
…
Fig. 2. Illustration of path planning problem considering
the increasing uncertainties
Once an attack is detected, the UAV is expected to land
on a secure position in the pre-calculated escape time
if possible. The path planning problem illustrated in
Figure 2 can be formulated as
Optimal path planning problem
s.t. xkesc = xlanding position
where the UAV should arrive at the landing position
before the escape time.
On the other hand, if a secure landing position is not
available, the UAV is expected to escape from the spoofer
within the escape time. If the output power of the GPS
spoofing signal is time invariant, the defender is able to
spot the spoofer through measurement of the GPS signal
strength (e.g., signal-to-noise ratio) with corresponding
state estimates. Then, the problem of interest becomes
Optimal path planning problem
s.t. P (‖xkesc − xspoofer‖ > csafe) > γ,
where xspoofer is the location of the spoofer, csafe is a pre-
determined distance such that the GPS spoofing signal
cannot affect the UAV, and γ < 1 denotes the desired
certainty.
6. SIMULATIONS
We simulate scenarios, where a UAV gets a GPS spoofing
attack during a flight to a target position. In the first
scenario, we simulate a system without attack detector,
where the UAV keeps using the normal state estimator
in Section 3.1 during the flight. In the second scenario,
the UAV detects the attack and then switches to the
emergency mode as illustrated in Figure 3.
Fig. 3. Illustration of the simulation scenario: (1) red
line denotes the flight path with normal mode under
GPS attack; (2) black line denotes the path with
emergency mode.
We use a double integrator UAV dynamics under the
GPS spoofing attack as in Kerns et al. (2014). The
discrete time state vector xk considers planar position
and velocity at time step k, i.e.
xk = [r
x
k , r
y
k, v
x
k , v
y
k ]
>,
where rxk , r
y
k denote x, y position coordinates, and v
x
k , v
y
k
denote velocity coordinates. With sampling time at 0.01
seconds, the double integrator model is discretized into
the following matrices:
A =
1 0 0.01 00 1 0 0.010 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
 , B =
 0 00 00.01 0
0 0.01
 ,
and outputs yG and yI measure positions from GPS and
IMU, respectively, with the output matrices:
CG =
[
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
]
, CI =
[
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
]
.
The covariance matrices of the sensing and disturbance
noises are chosen as
Σw = 0.0001I, ΣI = 0.001I, ΣG = 0.001I.
In the scenarios, the UAV is moving toward the target
position with the coordinates at (10, 10) by using feed-
back control 1 using the state estimate from the state
estimator. The GPS attack happens at time step 700.
The attack signal is d = [100, 100]>.
1 We implemented a proportional-derivative (PD) like tracking
controller, which is widely used for double integrator systems.
6.1 Standard estimator (without attack detector)
As shown in Figure 4, the state estimation is deceived
by the GPS attack. The position coordinate of the UAV
actually converges toward (−90,−90), however, the state
estimate shows it converges to the desired position at
(10, 10).
-150
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
0 1000 2000 3000
X 
Co
or
di
na
te
 [
m
]
Time Steps
State
Estimate
Fig. 4. State and estimate under the GPS attack at
k = 700.
6.2 Proposed method
The attack detector is able to detect the attack using
the normalized attack vector as shown in Figure 5. In
Figure 5, there is an evident spike of the detector state,
which implies there is an attack. Statistic significance of
the attack is tested using the CUSUM detector described
in (6) with the significance α at 1%.
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Fig. 5. Attack detection: Statistics denotes Sk defined
in (6) of CUSUM detector. The threshold equals to
χ2df (α)
1−δ with α = 0.01 and δ = 0.15.
Based on the hypothesis test result, we switch the system
mode to the emergency. As shown in Figure 6, the
proposed method mitigates the attack. However, we also
observe the drift of estimate in Figure 6. The drift
motivates us to estimate the bounds of the drift.
6.3 Statistical upper bound on error and escape time
Using the covariance estimate Pk and χ
2 test, we can
calculate a confidence interval as shown in Figure 7. The
error magnitudes of 10 sample trajectories are under the
99% confidence bound as shown in Figure 7. Note that
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Fig. 6. State and estimate with the attack mitigation.
the calculation of the confidence bound is deterministic.
Using Algorithm 1, we can calculate that it takes 290
steps (escape time) to reach the error threshold ‖ζ‖ = 2.
Alternatively, we can calculate a lower bound of the
escape time according to Theorem 4.3. The lower bound
is at 257 steps which can be verified in Figure 7.
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Fig. 7. The 99% confidence bound with the proposed
method, i. e.
√
χ2df (α)‖Pk‖ with α = 0.01, the upper
bound calculated in Theorem 4.3, and 10 sample
trajectories (gray colored) of ‖xk − xˆk‖.
7. CONCLUSION
This paper studies resilient state estimation of UAVs
in GPS denied environment. The KF-like estimator has
been designed and χ2 CUSUM algorithm is used to
detect the attack. In the presence of the attack, GPS
signals are not used to estimate the state, because they
do not contain valid information. Due to the limited
sensing device in the emergency mode, the estimation
suffers from the sensor drift problem. We calculate a
lower bound of the escape time, which is defined by the
safe time such that the estimation error remains in a
tolerable region with a high probability. A simulation of
the UAV demonstrates the results.
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